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V. JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is based upon U.C.A.
78-2a-3(2)(i) pursuant to which the Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over
appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including

but

division,

child

not

limited

custody,

to,

divorce,

support,

annulment,

visitation,

property

adoption,

and

paternity.

VI. ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue presented for review in this case is:
Did the trial court deprive the Appellant, Thomas Vicent
Dispenza of his constitutional right to a trial on the merits under
the

Constitution

of

the United

States. Amendment

Constitution of the United States. Amendment Fourteen

Five. and
and based

upon the Constitution of Utah. Article I. Section 7 and Article I,
Section 11 by denying him his right to due process of law.
The Standard of Review is the same as though the Lower Court
had granted a summary judgement disposing of the issues short of a
trial and therefore the Standard of Review is that the appellant is
entitled to have all of the facts presented and all the inferences
arising there from considered in a light most favorable to them.
Morris vs. Farnsworth Motel. 123 U 289. 259 P2nd 297 (19531.
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VII. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Constitutional Provisions sought to be interpreted are the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and
Article I. Section 7 of the Utah Constitution which provides:
That no person shall be deprived
property, without due process of law.

of

life, liberty

or

and Article I. Section 11 of the Utah Constitution which states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for and injury
done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administer
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecution or defending before any tribunal in
this state, by himself of counsel, any civil cause to which he
is a party.
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a dispute over child custody between two
unwed parents.
The Appellee, Tammy Degrauwe filed an action in the court
seeking custody of the Appellee's and Appellant's minor son.
Appellant

counterclaimed

and

sought

the

custody

of

his

The
son.

Temporary custody was granted to the Appellee pending a trial on
the merits. (Record transcript pages 1 though 3 and pages 17 though
20)
A Trial was scheduled before Judge John Rokich on August 4,
1992.

One of the reason the Appellant father was

contesting

custody was because he claimed he had been consistently denied
visitation with his son.

He was therefore willing to enter into a

trial period to see if he could obtain vistation in view of the
admonishment given by the court.

At that time a a temporary trial

period stipulation was reach with the provision that it would be a
2

ninety (90) day int

period with a review to be heard by the

court to see if the 01*.

was complied with by both parties and if

it should be adopted as f permanent order.

The court was called

into session and the int :min stipulation was read into the court
and agreed to by both parties. A portion of the stipulation read
into t.

cour reco

was that this stipulation would prevail and

abide

til 90 day

from this date, at which time or there about

there

uld be a review hearing.

Some the conditions of the

stipulation were are follows:
(1) Ina mother would have temporary custody of the child.
(2)

he prior problems with the child visitation by the

father would be solved by a strict scheduled being set by the court
and with a stern admonishment by the court to the mother that the
visitation schedule must be followed.
(3) The matter would be reviewed after ninety (90) days as to
the compliance of both parties.
(Transcript of the proceedings held on Tuesday August 4, 1992 page
1, lines 16 though 25, pages 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7)
An order was prepared by the Appellant's counsel and sent to
the Appellee's counsel for approval.
the

Appellee's

counsel

for

redraft

The order was sent back by
and

that

was

done

and

resubmitted to the Appellee counsel. After a considerable time, in
which the Appellee's counsel neither approved nor objected to the
order, had expired the Appellant's counsel submitted it to the
court for signing. Judge Rokich executed the order on October 15,
1992. (Record transcript pages 190 and 191)
3

A ninety day review had been scheduled on November 20,1992 but
was continued to November 30, 1992.
On November 5, 1992, a Motion to Set Aside the October 15,
1992 order was made by the Appellee's Counsel,
(record transcript 192 to 210)
At the November 30, 1992 review hearing the court set aside
the October 15th order and made awarded the custody of the child to
the Appellee. The Appellant father, who felt that the appellee had
violated the agreement wanted to proceed to trial on the merits but
was prevented from doing so because the court made an ad hoc ruling
granting awarding custody to the mother and there by deprived the
father of his due process rights of a trial on the merits.
According to the Appellant

the trial period arrangements was

entirely unsatisfactory and he desired to proceed to court on the
child custody issue.

It was a complete surprise to both the

Appellant and his counsel when the Judge set aside the order and
awarded permanent custody to the Appellee and thus depriving the
father of a trial on the merits.

IX. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.

The Appellant,

Thomas Vincent Dispenza was deprived of

his constitutional due process rights to hearing on the merits on
the issues of custody and child support payments and was deprived
of that hearing on the merits by the ruling of the court.
2.

The court entered an order providing for a trial period
4

only of temporary custody in the mother at the end of which time
the Appellant, Thomas Vincent Dispenza was entitled to proceed to
litigate the issues on the merits if he was dissatisfied on the
arrangements.
(1)

Mr. Dispenza in good faith endured the trial period of

custody in the mother but was consistently denied visitation and
elected to prosecute the case to a trial on the merits.
(2) The court then erroneously determined that Mr. Dispenza
had entered a finial stipulation and waived his rights to a trial
on the merits.
(3)

The Appellant, Thomas Vicent Dispenza did not wave his

rights to a trial on the merits.
(4)

The Appellant was denied his due process rights to a

trial on the merits under the Constitution of the United States.
(5)

The Appellant was denied his due process rights to a

trial on the merits under the Utah Constitution.
(6) The Appellant is entitled to a trial on the merits in a
domestic relation case.

X. ARGUMENT
A.
The appellant, Thomas Vicent Dispenza was deprived of his
constitutional due process rights to a hearing on the merits
on the issues of custody and child support payments and
was deprived of that hearing on the merits by the ruling of
the court.
This is the

event of facts which led the Appellant to enter

into a stipulation which was to conclude in only ninety (90) days.
5

This was not a permanent stipulation unless the terms

were

satisfoactory for both parties of this litigation which it did not.
As to the facts that this was only a ninety (90) stipulation one
must read from the proceedings of the August 4, 1992 hearing and is
quoted below from page 1 lines 1 though 19:
Mr. Summerhays: This stipulation will prevail and abide
until 90 days from this date, at which time, or there about,
we will be given a date by the clerk for a an automatic review
by the court.
The order that was signed by the Judge Rokich on October 15, 1992
states language as to the temporary state of the order found on
page 190 of the record transcript as follows:
The Plaintiff shall have temporary custody of the
parties7s minor son during the pendency of this ninety day
interim order subject to the defendant having reasonable
visitation more particularly set forth in the standard
schedule of visitation presently recognized by this court and
in addition to this said schedule of visitation, the defendant
shall have visitation with the minor son every Wednesday from
5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.
On November 30, 1992 Judge Rokich set aside the October 15,
1992 order and made a new order without hearing the facts or issues
involved in this case. The constitutes a violation of due process
which is a right under both the Constitution of the United States
and the Utah Constitution.
B.
The court entered an order providing for a trial period only
of temporary custody in the mother at the end of which time
the Appellant, Thomas Vicent Dispenza was entitled to proceed
to litigate the issues on the merits.
As has been previously discussed the stipulation was only
prevail and abide for ninety (90) days at which time the court
would review and determine if the parties abided by the order and
6

if it was a workable order.

If the order was not working then by

the rights of due process the case should have been scheduled for
trial again and each side should have the opportunity to present it
case.

This was never done and the Appellant was denied his

constitution rights.
C.
Mr. Dispenza in good faith endured the trial period of custody
in the mother but was consistently denied visitation and
elected to prosecute the case to a trial on the merits.
During the ninety (90) day interim period there were many
problems that arose from the Appellee's a live in boy friend.
There were also arguments with the Appellant and Appellee over
transportation.

These disputes were brought to the attention of

the Judge at the proceedings held on November 30, 1992.
Quoting from the transcript of the proceeding page 2 line 25 and
page 3 lines 1 though 9 as follows:
Court— Now, its's my understanding that there has been some
problem with regards to visitation; is that correct?
Defendant: Yes.
The Court: and the court is going to make an order that if
either party comes back before the court and the court finds
that there is a violation of the visitation schedule, that
party who has violated the order will be forthwith admitted to
the Salt Lake County Jail for two days.
(proceeding transcript of November 30, 1992 page 3 lines 23 though
25 and page 4 line 1)
The court: The one concern, I thought there was an individual
living at the house that precludes him from going to the house
because they always have words.
The court also had concerns about the visitation problems and made
the stern admonishment to both parties at the second hearing. Mr.
Dispenza had endured all of the problems with visitation including
7

denial by the appellee, verbal abuse by the live in boy friend and
transportation problems. It was clear that the arrangement had not
worked out and when Mr. Dispenza appeared at the second hearing he
had decided that it would be best to continue with the trial and
seek custody of the child on the merits and facts of the case but
was denied this right to due process by the judge's new order.
D.
The court erroneously determined that Mr. Dispenza had
entered a finial stipulation and waived his rights to a trial
on the merits.
It is clear from the transcript of August 4, 1992 that Mr.
Dispenza was only stipulation

and agreeing to abide to the

provisions for ninety (90) days as a test period to seek if the
stipulation was feasible. As is shown by the proceeding transcript
on page 1 lines 16 though 19 as is quoted below:
Mr. Summerhays: This stipulation will prevail and abide until
90 days from this date, at which time, or there about, we
will be given a date by the clerk for an automatic review by
the court,
It is clear that Mr. Dispenza did not wave his rights to a trial
but merely entered into a ninety (90) day interim period.

The

court assumed away the rights of the Appellant to his day in court
to present the facts in the case.
E.
The Appellant, Thomas Vicent Dispenza did not wave his rights
to a trial on the on the merits.
As has been discussed previously this was only a ninety (90)
day interim period to see if the stipulation was feasible.

Mr.

Dispenza did not wave his rights to due process but was rather
8

denied these rights by the court. Due process is a right given to
all citizens of the United States by Amendments to the Constitution
but also given to every resident of the State of Utah through the
Utah Constitution.
In the case of Celebrity Club Incorporated vs. Utah Liquor
Control Commission, 657 P2nd 1293,1296 the court explained the due
process of guaranteed as follows:
Neither a court nor other judicial tribunal may deny a person
constitutional rights or deprive such person of a vested
interest in property with any opportunity to be heard. To do so
constitutes taking of property without due process of law.
Many attempt have been made to further define "due process"
but they all resolve into the thought that a party shall have his
day in court- that is each party shall have the right to a
hearing before a competent court, with the privilege of being
heard and introduction evidence to establish his cause or
defense, after which comes judgement upon which thus made.
also see Hailing vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 71 Utah 112,
125, 263 P 78, 82 (1927); Christensen vs. Harris 109 Utah 1, 6, 7,
163 P2nd 314, 315 (1945) and Regans vs. District Court of Salt Lake
County, 89 Utah 183,217: 51 P2nd 645, 660 (1935).
F.
The Appellant was denied his due process rights to a trial on
the merits under the Utah Constitution Articles I, Sections 7
& 11.
Under the Utah Constitution Article I, Sections 7 & 11 Mr,
Dispenza was guaranteed the right to due process but he has been
denied this right.

The Utah Constitution provides in Article I,

Section 7 as follows:
No person shall be deprived life, liberty or property, without
due process of law.
The Utah Constitution provides in Article I, Section 11 as
9

follows:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury to
him and his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law, which shall be administered without
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
state, by himself or counsel in any civil cause in which he is
a party.
These rights of due process as described above were denied to the
Appellant by order of the court which out a trial on the merits.
G.
The Appellant was denied his due process rights to a trial on
the merits under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution of the United States.
An opportunity for a hearing before competent and impartial
tribunal upon proper notice is one of the essential elements of due
process under Amendments Five and Fourteen of the Constitution of
the United States as is evidences in the following cases; Armstrong
vs. Manzo, 380 US 545. 14 L Ed 2nd 62, 66; Schroeder vs. New York,
371 US 208, 9 L Ed 2nd 255; Shield vs. Utah I.C.R. Co. , 105 US 177,
83 L Ed 111; Powell vs. Alabama, 287 US 45, 77 L Ed 158; Blackmer
vs. United States, 284 US 421, 76 L Ed 375; Farmers Union Property
& Casualty Co. vs. Thompson 4 Utah 2nd 7, 286 P2nd 249; Employees
of Utah Fuel Co. vs. Industrial Com of Utah, 99 Utah 88, 104 P2nd
197; Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. vs. Public Service Com., 99 Utah 28,
96 P2nd 722.
The right to be heard before being condemned to suffer
grievous loss of any kind is a principle basic to our society as is
demonstrated in Wisconsin vs. Constantineau, 400 US 433, 27 L Ed 2d
515.

When

interests

involving
10

liberty

and

property

rights

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are implicated, the right to
some

kind

of

prior

hearing

is

paramount.

This

point

is

demonstrated in Board of Regents vs. Roth. 408 US 564, 33 L Ed 2nd
548. In this case the Appellant has been deprived of his rights and
the minor child has also been deprived of his constitutional rights
to a fair and impartial hearing as to which arrent he will reside.
The Appellant is a real party of interest to assert those rights.
All of the cases cited under the previous section as to why
the Appellant's rights were violated under the Utah Constitution
are apropoe and formulate an addition basis as to why the Appellant
was deprived of his rights under the Federal Constitution.
H.
The Appellant is entitled to a trial on the merits in a
domestic relation case.
In the Celebrity Club Inc.. supra the defendant argued that the
Plaintiff's

interest in his liquor lease did not constitute

"property" within the meaning of the Utah Constitution provisions.
The court stated at pages 1296 and 1297 as follows:
Although it is true that the United States Supreme Court once
recognized a distinction between "rights" and "privileges" in
determining whether to afford due process protection to
asserted property rights, that Court has now "sully and
finally rejected the wooden distinction between *right7 and
privileges7" Board of Regents vs. Roth, 408 US 564. 571. 92
S. Ct 2710. 33 L Ed 2nd 548 (1972). In recent cases, the
Court has expressed in preference for a more flexible
definition of "property" in this contest:
lf
{P}roperty" interests subject to procedural due
process protection are not limited by a few rigid,
technical forms. Rather, "property" denotes a broad
range of interests that are secured by "existing rules or
understand."
It is a purpose of the ancient institution of
property to protect those claims upon which people rely
in their daily lives, reliance that must not be
11

arbitrarily undermined.
It is a purpose of the
constitutional right to a hearing to provide an
opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.
Under a child custody case as is the focus of this case the
defendant in a sense is denied something that belongs to him with
the process of law of a trial on the merits to determine which
parent would be better suited for the child to reside with.
XI. CONCLUSION
The Appellant and his son were denied of their constitutional
rights to a hearing on the merits. Under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and under
Article I, Sections 7 and 11 of the Utah Constitution it is clear
that they did not receive due process as is guaranteed under the
constitutions.

This case should be remanded back to the lower

court for a trial on the merits.
DATED this

\i±^

day of

v„it

1993.

ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS

Lowell V. Summerhays^ v
Attorney for Appellant
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